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VOLUME 1 WINTER, 1951 NUMBER 2
WARTIME SECURITY AND LIBERTY UNDER LAW
By ROBERT H. JACKSON*
T 0 initiate this series of namesake lecturers is an honor and its association with
the memory of James McCormack Mitchell imposes a responsibility. Here
in Western New York, when I was admitted to its bar Mr. Mitchell already
ranked high in its long list of eminent advocates, jurists and intellectual leaders.
What Mr. Mitchell was, most of us young men hoped to become. In the courts,
his character, scholarship and industry were highly respected-he was counselor
to men of important affairs, his cultural interests were broader than his craft,
and he was among the most effective influences that fostered this University
and its Law School
Mr. Mitchell once described the intellectual atmosphere which then permeated
higher professional life by borrowing the words of his friend and preceptor,
John G. Milburn, another of Buffalo's most gifted advocates:
" . . .It is a noble profession and worthy of a man's deepest
devotion. It affords the largest opportunities for the realization of
moral ideals, and it never fails in intellectual interest. Its work is in
the main stream of the life of the time. It may be establishing a rule of
law for the conduct of business, the working out of some adjustment
of the existing legal system to new economic or industrial tendencies,
the organization of a corporation, the formulation of the terms of an
enterprise, or the devolution of an estate. Each day has its problems
requiring thought, study and action. The law itself is constantly changing
in its adaptation to new conditions, new requirements, new tendencies,
new needs. I cannot imagine a more interesting field of labor. Its satis-
factions are the satisfactions of a mind actively employed in scientific
investigation, in the .quest of knowledge and- in practical affairs. Its
rewards are position, influence, personal distinction and a reasonable
affluence."'
The work which they mention as "in the main stream of the life of the
time," you will notice, does not include many of today's professional pursuits,
*Associate Justice, Supreme Court of The United States, in an address deliv-
ered at Buffalo Law School, May 9, 1951.
1. Manuscript address by Mr. Mitchell, "John G. Milburn," Thursday Club,
November, 1943.
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such as taxation, labor relations, or practice before various administrative tribunals.
Two World Wars and world-wide depression brought new issues. Mr. Milburn
omitted any reference to legal struggles over national security or civil liberty, no
doubt because that time held no serious threat to security and liberty was taken
for granted. The Union had survived, and the North had recovered from the
Civil War. The ideas of our Declaration of Independence and our Bill of Rights
held the initiative throughout the world and old systems of autocracy were fall-
ing before them. The West was still lighted by the afterglow of the American
Revolution. Counterrevolution, under the banners of Marxism, had? not yet be-
come a world power, nor had its agents in serious numbers infiltrated our country
to claim shelter of our Constitution while conspiring to bring about its overthrow.
We can no longer take either security or liberty for granted. The best that we
can now hope for seems to be a prolonged period of international tension and
rumors of war, with war itself as the ever threatening alternative. For security
against foreign attack we must look to the professions which manage our armed
forces and to the economy of the country that sustains them. But I see not
the slightest probability in the foreseeable future that any conqueror can impose
oppression upon us, and the dangers to our liberties which I would discuss with
you are those that we create among ourselves.
The essence of liberty is the rule of law. Only when impersonal forces which
we know as law are strong enough to restrain both official action and action by
private groups is there ieal personal liberty. Liberty is not mere absence of
restraint, it is not a spontaneous product of majority rule, it is not achieved
merely by lifting formerly depressed classes to power, it is not the inevitable by-
product of technological advancement. Freedom is achieved only by a complex
but just structure of rules of law, impersonally and dispassionately enforced
against both rules and the governed. Because liberty cannot exist apart from the
impartial rule of law, it is vulnerable to wartime stresses, for then the rule of
law breaks down. The same passions and anxieties may result from a long period
of tension which may be almost as demoralizing as actual war.
The United States has survived two modern wars without serious or perm-
anent impairment of our system of ordered liberty under law. That may be
due more to good fortune than to wisdom. We were not a belligerent in either
World War, except for a part of its duration; Continental United States was never
invaded; our cities were not bombed. While we talked a great deal about "all-out-
war," we never began to mobilize men or resources or impaired the civilian statid-
ard of living to the extent that Germany or England did and as we would have
to do in a long, hard war.
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But it is even more important to recall that our Government, during those
wars, did not have to combat a really numerous, cohesive or well-organized in-
ternal opposition. The Nazis had no effective or far-reaching underground of
their own here. During the time Stalin was a partner of Hider, it was the ex-
tensive and disciplined Communist underground which was at their joint service.
That was of sufficient magnitude and efficiency, with propaganda, political strikes,
espionage and sabotage, to retard our preparations and to slow aid to victims
of aggression. But before we were attacked, Hider had turned on the Soviet
Union, and the only way the Communists could support Russia's war was to sup-
port our war. Had not this change in their course occurred before we became
a belligerent, drastic measures to disable them from doing harm would certainly
have been undertaken.
There is no reason to suppose that we will be so fortunate again. The only
probable future enemy is now supported by fanatical partisans within our midst.
In strategic places, in communications, government, labor or industry, they could
give valuable aid and comfort to the enemy. Probably much greater than their
capacity for actual harm is their capacity to arouse fears and hatreds among us.
A secret conspiratorial group, even if not very potent itself, can goad the Govern-
ment into striking blindly and fiercely at all suspects in a manner inconsistent
with our normal ideas of civil liberties.
If we take the first ten Amendments to the Constitution as the legal struc-
ture which contains the substance of our liberties, we find that they fall into
two general clashes. Some are primarily addressed to courts and judges and tell
us how we shall manage the judicial process. Others are addressed primarily to
Congress or the Executive and place limitations on their powers.
Those admonitions addressed to the judges are designed to keep the judicial
process as independent, neutral and non-partisan as procedural safeguards can,
and to make certain that courts will not be used as instruments of oppression or
of political policy. These provisions are relatively explicit and concrete and deal
with well-defined legal concepts or long-established: practices. They are procedural
and appeal more to the understanding of lawyers than of the populace. An
excited public opinion sometimes discredits them as "technicalities" which ir-
ritate by causing delays and permitting escapes from what it regards as justice.
But by and large, sober second thought sustains most of them as essential safe-
guards -of fair law enforcement and worth whatever delays or escapes they cost.
These procedural safeguards include the right of the people to be "secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against ureasonable searches and
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seizures" and the requirement of particularity in search warrants; 2 prosecution
only by grand jury indictment, prohibition of double jeopardy for the same of-
fense, the right of an accused not to be a witness against himself, and the right
not to suffer deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law.3
They guarantee speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the people from
the locality where the crime was committed, the right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the accusing witnesses,
to have compulsory process for obtaining defense witnesses and to have assis-
tance of counsel;4 the guarantee of jury trial,5 and the proscription of excessive
bail, fines or cruel and unusual punishment.6 These bear primarily on the con-
duct of judicial business.
Other provisions embody political policies deemed essential to a free society,
and admonish primarily the political branches of government. Time has rendered
some of these less important, as, for example, those which permit the people to
keep and bear arms 7 and limit the quartering of soldiers in private homes.8 At
least, they are productive of almost no current litigation, Another which our
forefathers regarded as of prime importance to the maintenance of liberty was
the Tenth Amendment, which reserved to the States or to the people all un.
delegated and unprohibited powers, and was intended to prevent undue concentra-
tion of power and centralization of authority in the Federal Government. Of
course, the allocation of power between State and Nation is a fundamentally
political question, however it incidentally may be involved in legal controversies.
The one really decisive conflict between the central and local government was
settled only by civil war. I am not sure that this part of the Bill of Rights is
not on its way to obsolescence as a legal doctrine, whatever it may have of political
vitality. Contentions based on it have not prospered in the Supreme Court in re-
cent years, although at former times they found considerable hospitality there.
The Tenth Amendment may become as impotent juridically as the provision that
each State is guaranteed republican form of government which the courts candid-
ly reject as legally enforcible doctrine and regard as presenting only political
issues."
2. U. S. Const., Amend. IV.
3. Id., Amend. V.
4. Id., Amend. VL
5. Id., Amend. VII.
6. Id., Amend. VIII.
7 Id., Amend. MI.
8. Id., Amend. IIL
9. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1
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Legal controversy has more and more been generated by the Amendments
that primarily are restraints upon the Legislative or Executive branches of govern-
ments. Chief sources of litigation for many years were the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment, applied as limitation on substantive law.10 Recently,
litigation has more often succeeded by invoking the First Amendment, now ap-
plied to prohibit abridgment of freedom of speech, press, assembly and religion
and establishment of religion by states, cities, school boards and local courts, as
well as by congress. 1
Whatever the defects of our constitutional system of legal liberties, how-
ever much the generality of their statement permits uncertain applications and
varying interpretations, it can hardly be questioned that they have guided the
courts in normal times to a protection of the rights of the individual against the
mass, and the citizen against the government, that compares favorably with the
conditions of any nation. We should not forget, however, that we are not the
only people who love and cherish liberty, and we are not the only ones to find
that external pressures and threats produce internal reactions which divert their
institutions from their usual course.
Some modern nations have forthrightly recognized that war or external
dangers do upset the normal balance between liberty and authority. They have
recognized, too, that fear and anxiety create public demands for greater assurance
which may not be justified by necessity but which any popular government finds
irresistible. They have met this by providing for some emergency powers or
temporary crisis government. Their experiments are well worth study, though
time today permits only most general reference.12
After the First World War, the -Weimar Constitution guaranteed freedom
of opinion and expression, of assembly and association, and inviolability of the
person and of domicile, to the Germans. For its time and place, it constituted
a rather advanced bill of rights in the Western tradition. However, the President
of the Republic was empowered temporarily to suspend any or all of these in-
10. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses are distinguished as to
their disabling effect on government in dissent in Railway Express Agency v.
New York, 336 U. S. 106, 111. See Hough, Due Process of Law-Today, 32 Harv.
L. Rev. 218, 228. The history of due process litigation is set out in Jackson, The
Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 24-74.
11. See e. g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U. S. 268; Terminiello v. Ohicago, 337 U. S. 1; Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558;
Illinois, ex rel. McCollu-n v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203; Board of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141; Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U. S. 105; Jones v. Opelika, 319 U. S. 103.
12. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, Princeton Press, 1948, is a compre-
hensive study of crisis in government in Germany, England and France.
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dividual rights if the public safety and order were seriously disturbed or en-
dangered. This proved a temptation to every -government, of whatever shade
of opinion, and in thirteen years it was invoked on more than 250 occasions.
Upon the burning of the Reichstag, Hitler attributed it to the Communists, al-
though there was substantial evidence at the Nurnberg trial that the Nazis burned
it themselves. In the excitement, he persuaded President von Hindenburg to
suspend all such rights.13 They were never restored.
The French, taught by their history, provided for a very different kind of
emergency government, known as the "state of siege." Unlike the German emer-
gency dictatorship, it can be invoked, not by action of the Executive, but as a
parliamentary measure. And, unlike the German, it is not regarded as a suspen-
sion or abrogation of law bur, with characteristic French logic, is made a legal
institution, governed by legal principles and terminable by parliamentary author-
ity.
Great Britain also has fought both World Wars under a temporary dictator-
ship of sorts. As there are no written constitutional limitations upon the power
of the British Parliament, it simply provides a crisis government by delegating
a larger measure than usual of its own absolute power to the Ministers, but al-
ways subject to recall at its will and subject to its scrutiny and supervision in ad-
ministration. In each World War, Parliament, by its Defense of the Realm Act,
has delegated to its ministers powers beyond those which Congress could delegate
consistently with our Bill of Rights.
It may be significant that the short-lived German system, which resulted in
dictatorship, allowed the Executive to enhance its own power by suspending
civil rights. Both France and England retain that power in the Legislative branch,
though in England the separation of power is rather nominaL But all three
countries invoked emergency government as a political decision with which the
Tudiciary had nothing to do. Neither in Germany, France nor England could
any court set aside the government's exercises of emergency power or review its
fundamental legality.
There is a popular impression, fostered by ignorance of our history, that
civil liberties in this country are not so vulnerable, and that courts are always
open as the sanctuary from arbitrary government. The historical fact is, how-
ever, that several ways have been found to close the courts for any effective enforce-
ment of civil rights and that one sentence of our Constitution has proved suf-
13. The progress of measures for the overthrow of German freedoms is tracedin some detail in I Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (GPO 1947) 184, and in more
condensed form in the address opening, on behalf of the American prosecution,the Nurnberg trial of the major Nazi war criminals, id., at 120. Also reported 2Proceedings, International Military Tribunal 105.
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ficient to introduce emergency government with about all the freedom from
judicial restraint that any dictator could ask, That is Article I, Section 9, clause 2,
which reads: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."
While courts might inquire whether the conditions existed which permit the
suspension, "Invasion" might be construed to include an air attack on any part
of our territory-an extremely probable incident of any war. There is authority
to the effect that only Congress can suspend the privilege,14 but it was not only
suspended by President Lincoln-without authority from Congress-he delegated
authority to his generals to suspend it in their discretion. In 1863, Congress
authorized and ratified the Presidential suspension and sought to mitigate some
of its abuses.',
Civil War history teaches that suspension of privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is in effect a suspension of every other liberty. President Lincoln at the
outset of his administration suspended the privilege and resorted to wholesale
arrests without warrants, detention without trial, and imprisonment without
judicial conviction. Authorities say that there were certainly 13,000 of such deten-
tions for suspected disloyalty and estimates run the figures as high as 38,000.1c
Since the population of the Northern States in 1860 was only about 22,000,000,
the Lincoln arrests without warrant probably would be equivalent to arrest of
100,000 persons out of our present population. This policy was sharply but un-
availingly condemned in May of 1861 by the aged Chief Justice Taney. Let him
state the case:
"The case, then, is simply this: a military officer, residing in Pennsyl-
vania, issues an order to arrest a citizen of Maryland, upon vague and
indefinite charges, without any proof, so far as appears; under this order,
his house is entered in the night, he is seized as a prisoner, and conveyed
to Fort McHenry, and there kept in close confinement; and when a
habeas corpus is served on the commanding officer, requiring him to
produce the prisoner before a justice of the supreme court, in order that
he may examine into the legality of the imprisonment, the answer of
the officer, is that he is authorized by the president to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus at his discretion, and in the excercise of that discretion,
suspends it in this case, and on that ground refuses obedience to the writ.
"As the case comes before me, therefore, I understand that the
president not only claims the right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
14. Chief Justice Marshall, Ex parte Boflman, 4 Cranch 75, 101; Chief Justice
Taney, Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9487; See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall.
2, 125.
15. Habeas Corpus Act of Mar. 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 755.
16. Hall, Free Speech in War Times, 21 Col. L. Rev. 526, It is interesting to
note that Dean Hall, on whose researches I rely, was once associated with Mr.
Mitchell in the practice of law in this City and was a native of nearby James-
town, N. Y.
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himself, at his discretion, but to delegate that discretionary power to a
military officer, and to leave it to him to determine whether he will or
will not obey judicial process that may be served upon him.
"In such a case, my duty was too plain to be mistaken. I have
exercised all the power which the constitution and laws confer upon
me, but that power has been resisted by a force too strong for me to
overcome."17
Carl Sandburg's does not gloss over the abuses committed under cover of
suspension of the privilege of the writ. Private mail was opened. Cabinet officers
simply sent telegrams ordering named persons to be arrested and held without com-
munication or counsel General Burnside suppressed the Cdicago Times and
seized its newspaper plant. He also arrested Vallandigham, a rather scurvy
character, who had been in Congress and was the Democratic candidate for
Governor of Ohio. He was tried by Military Commission and convicted. His
application for a writ of habeas corpus was denied upon the ground that General
Burnside had received authority to suspend the writ. Lincoln then ordered
Vallandigham to be transported back of the Confederate lines and left there.
President Lincoln, in his famous letter to "Erastus Corning and Others," in
defending his conduct said all that ever can be said, and what always is said, in
favor of such policies in time of emergency. He drew a distinction between peace-
time arrests and jailing men during rebellion. "In the latter case arrests are made
nor so much for what has been done as for what probably would be done ... Un-
der cover of 'liberty of speech,' 'liberty of the press' and 'habeas corpus' they hoped
to keep on foot amongst us a most efficient corps of spies, informers, suppliers,
and aiders and abettors of their cause in a thousand ways ... Nothing is better
known to history than that courts of justice are utterly incompetent in such cases.
Civil courts are organized for trial of individuals ... in quiet times ... Again, ajury too frequently has at least one member more ready to hang the panel than to
hang the traitor." And he asked, "Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who
deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to
desert?"
President Lincoln there voiced the impatience with the process of the civil
courts that always develops in wartime and the demand that various conduct or
speech, believed harmful to society, be punished summarily by some sort of Mili-
tary Commission. His suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
had opened the door to this procedure, and it outlived him. On May 1, 1865,
President Johnson ordered a military commission to try those accused of con-
17. Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9487.
18. 2 Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln, The War Years, 155-175.
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spiracy to assassinate President Lincoln. The civil courts were open and function-
ing in the District of Columbia and the acts constituted crimes under its law. The
War Department set up this Commission, and two days later it served its charges.
A plea to the jurisdiction, certainly one of substance in the light of later decisions,
was overruled on the day it was filed. On May 12, four days after it was created,
with the press and public excluded, the Military Commission started the trial.
Conviction followed promptly. Application for a writ of habeas corpus was
made to the court in the District of Columbia, and the writ issued. Gen. Hancock
made return refusing to produce the defendants, by direction of the President,
who certified that, "The writ of habeas corpus has been heretofore suspended in
such cases as this, and I do specially suspend this writ and direct you to proceed
to execute" the judgment of the Military Commission. Thereupon, the court ruled
that it must yield, and the sentences were carried into execution.19 The perform-
ance of this Military Commission was hardly an edifying example of the judicial
process and soon the Supreme Court decided Ex parte Milligan, by which the su-
premacy of civil courts was restored.
Another method of dosing the courts to aggrieved citizens that is not wholly
precluded by our Constitution is the-declaration of "martial law," which is nothing
less than the taking over by the army of civil authority in an area of military oper-
ations where civil government is unable to function. It is a law of necessity and
is administered by executive power. It was invoked, and most improvidently
used, during the recent war in the Hawaiian Islands, where the conflict between
civil and military power was sharp. After hostilities ceased, it was finally curbea
by the Supreme Court.20 While there is some judicial control of the resort to
martial law, the courts, as Chief Justice Taney pointed out, have no force equal
to the task if military authorities refuse to heed them. The Hawaiian experience
is very instructive but too long to detail and is fully exposed in legal literature.21
Another device which has been used to take the law out of the hands of the
Judiciary has been to enact legislation to deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdic-
tion. Under our constitutional structure, the Supreme Court has appellate jur-
isdiction "with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall
19. Pitman, The Assassination of President Lincoln and The Trial of the
Conspirators.
20. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U. S. 304.
21. The story of martial law in Hawaii may be found in many periodicals, in-
cluding Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency, 55 Harv.
L. Rev. 1253; Fairman, The Supreme Court on Military Jurisdiction-Martial
Rule in Hawaii and the Yamashita Case, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 833; Armstrong, Martial
Law in Hawaii, 29 A. B. A. 5. 698; McColloch, Now It Can Be Told: Judge Metz-
ger and the Military, 55 A. B. A. J. 365; Anthony, Martial Law in Hawaii, 30 Cal.
L. Rev. 371; King, The Legality of Martial Law in Hawaii, 30 Cal. L. Rev. 599.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
make."22  In 1869, a case involving the validity of certain "reconstruction" meas-
ures had been argued and was under consideration by the Supreme Court. Fearing
an adverse decision, Congress, over the veto of President Johnson, repealed the
Act on which its jurisdiction rested.23 The Court thereupon dismissed the case
for want of jurisdiction. 24 This practice could be carried to almost any extreme
that public sentiment would tolerate.
Thus, you see in several ways judicial power can be foreclosed from its ordi-
nary function of standing between the inhabitant and unlawful assertion of power
by government. Liberties are not so inflexibly buttressed as most persons suppose
and a public sentiment that would sustain closing of the, courts could lead to
serious consequences.
But if we assume that courts retain public confidence and will not tolerate
resort to any of these devices, the judicial handling of wartime cases and contro-
versies still present disappointing departures, not only from the ideal, but from
the ordinary.
One of the weakest links in any system of adjudication at any time is fact-
finding. Through the jury system, the public participates, indeed almost monopo-
lizes, fact-finding in administration of criminal justice. Ordinarily, an accused
feels this to be an assurance of fairness, because lay jurors coming from the masses
of the people are not likely to favor harsh, oppressive, farfetched or merely tech.
nical prosecutions. But, in wartime, the jury itself may be most susceptible to
inflamed opinion and return convictions which judges, if the responsibility were
theirs, might deny. No matter how fair the judge tries to be, if the jury, by radio,
press and television, are constantly impressed that the public expects and demands
convictions, that prosecution witnesses are credible, that defendants have evil back-
grounds, the verdict is apt to register this prejudgment.
Judges, too, sometimes give way to passion and partisanship. The judicial
process works best in an atmosphere of calmness, patience and deliberation. In
times of anxiety, the public demands haste and a show of zeal on the part of
judges, whose real duty is neutrality and detachment.
Wartime psychology plays no favorites among rights but tends to break
down any right which obstructs its path. And the fall of one weakens others.
22. U. S. Const., Art. III, §2, cl. 2.
23. 15 Stat. 44, March 27, 1868, repealing that part of 14 Stat. 385, Feb. 5,
1867, conferring appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court In habeas corpus
cases. As a study in political courage, one should read the veto message of Presi-
dent Johnson, then undergoing his impeachment trial before the Senate which
passed the Act. See Stryker, Andrew Johnson, A Study In Courage.
24. Ex parte Mcoardle, 7 Wall. 506.
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The Bill of Rights Amendments were all adopted at one time and were designed
to present a comprehensive and integrated pattern of a free society. The Consti-
tution established no priority among them. But, of late, one school of judges
has adopted as a principle of judicial decision that freedom of speech, press and
assembly are "preferred rights" and are to be given a "preferred position."25 Large
vested interests engaged in communications enterprises welcome this classification.
So also do the Communists, as these happen to be the rights most frequently in-
voked to shelter them in their attacks upon our Government. The great difficulty
with the preferred-rights doctrine is that it crowds some others into the position
of deferred rights. There is some indication, for example, that freedom from un-
reasonable searches and seizures does not enjoy the preferred rating.28
So-called property rights are, of course, among the deferred, and they are
especially vulnerable in wartime. The two provisions of the Constitution most often
invoked in behalf of them are the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and the provision of the Fifth Amendment that private property
shall not be taken for public use except upon just compensation. There has been
a sharp and desirable reaction from that period when a court could say, "It should
be remembered that of the three fundamental principles which underlie govern-
ment, and for which government exists, the protection of life, liberty and property,
the chief of these is property .. 27
Property is particularly vulnerable in modem war. Communism and Socialism
have no more effective allies and promoters than total war. Control of prices,
allocation of raw materials, priorities in transportation, requisitions, compulsory
orders, renegotiations, leave little of the system of private enterprise. Military
socialization comes wrapped in patriotism, while political socialization is deemed
alien and un-American. Wartime business and property controls usually outlast
the wars. It is no accident that the European peoples who have had total war
and most complete militarization find it so easy to adopt socialization. No one
who follows the trend of decision would expect the courts to be a bulwark against
it in wartime, if indeed they are at any time.
But our forefathers deemed the personal right to acquire, own and manage
property as one of those liberties essential to a free society. A large degree of
freedom from government control in these matters was as much a part of their
philosophy as was freedom from interference in speech, press, or religion. It may
25. See dissent, Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 180, and cases there
cited. Compare Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145; Trupiano v. United States,
334 U. S. 699; and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56.
26. See n. 25.
27. Judge Van Orsdel, setting aside the Minimum Wage Law of the District
of Columbia, Children's Hospital v. Adkins, 284 Fed. 613, 622.
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be open to question whether we can completely abandon laissez faire as to property
and retain it as to person. When acceptance of a war order is compulsory on an
employer, it is more easy to argue that labor to perform it should be compulsory.
When scarce materials are allocated, the argument is strengthened for allocation
of labor. Each liberty found in our Bill of Rights furnishes a sort of lateral sup-
port for every other, and when one is withdrawn or deferred the foundations of
all are weakened.
Property and enterprise, of course, require more regulation than persons, buthostility to property as an institution was no part of our constitutional scheme and
should find no place in its interpretation. Wisely or not, our forefathers regarded
the personal right to acquire, accumulate and enjoy property as the great incentive
to individual effort. If not controlled in the interests of society, it can be abused,
especially where exploitation of natural resources or the labor of others is in-
volved. But those countries which, under Communist domination, have largely
abolished the property incentive have felt obliged to substitute a far more harsh
and oppressive system of labor compulsion, enforced by penalties upon the person.
Bad as the evils of our system may be painted, they do not equal those of the,
only alternative yet brought forth-mass transfers from the country to the fac-
tories, forced labor, work camps, heavy penalties for absenteeism and for failure
to meet standards of quantity or quality in production. The most callous and
brutal of all inducements to labor are those applied by the dictator state. In fact,
there is reason to believe that even they are returning to the incentive system, be-
cause they find compulsion has passed the point of diminishing returns.
Moreover, we must not forget that enjoyment of personal rights often willdepend upon enjoyment of some property right. For example, what is modern
freedom of the press worth without the right to occupy a costly plant, hire compe-
tent labor, obtain adequate paper and supplies? A high-handed government could
do much to get rid of an objectionable newspaper without passing any law abridg-
ing freedom of the press. The government might, for example, condemn the
newspaper building and even the physical presses and equipment for its own use.
Courts will not inquire into the justification for an exercise of eminent domain.
But, under recently approved practice, it need not even put the owner in funds
to replace the building, for it need not take the title. Instead, the government
may take only the use-and that for an unstated time-and pay only the rental
as it accrues. 28 Even if the owner has other resources to build a new plant, he
may find himself blocked in getting scarce materials or transportation priorities,
or subject to discrimination in rationing of paper. When in these'matters he
turns to the courts, he finds little relief from these administrative decisions, and
that little long-delayed. Meanwhile, he is out of business, his advertising cus-
28. See United States v. Westinghouse Co., 339 U. S. 261, and cases there cited.
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tomers gone, his subscribers vanished, his goodwill destroyed. Certainly if an
evil government desired to destroy freedom of a hostile press, it would approach
it, not through direct suppression, but through unfair administration of property
regulations. That is why any doctrine of deferred rights is dangerous and es-
pecially if we defer those rights that are an essential to fair administration of
the laws.
I suppose the American people, on whose eternal vigilance liberty ultimately
depends, are well agreed that what they want of the courts is that they both pre-
serve liberty and protect security, finding ways to reconcile the two needs so that
we do not lose our heritage in defending it.
The issue that usually comes to the courts, however, is not a dear and simple
one between security and liberty. The issue as we get it is more nearly-this:
Measures violative of constitutional rights are claimed to be necessary to security,
in the judgment of officials who are best in a position to know, but the necessity
is not provable by ordinary evidence and the court is in no position to deter-
mine the necessity for itself. What does it do then? The best study of the impact
of such claims upon the judicial process during wartime is Korematsu v. United
States,29 the precedent that I fear will long be most useful to justify wartime in-
vasions of civil liberty. It was not a case where the Court was asked by a citizen
to obstruct execution by military authorities of a military order. It was a case
where the Government asked the Court to become, itself, the agency to enforce
against the citizen, by criminal process, a military policy of dubious constitution-
ality. That policy was to remove all persons of Japanese ancestry, including native-
born American citizens, from the west coast and herd them into camps in the
interior. When enforcement of that measure came squarely before the Supreme
Court, three judicial policies were advocated, none of which can be said to be
wholly satisfying.
One view, certainly the popular view at the time, was sponsored in the opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Black, with support of Chief Justice Stone, Justices Reed,
Douglas and Rutledge, and a concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter. It held
exclusion and detention of citizens of Japanese ancestry constitutionally valid.
Korematsu, it reasoned, was detained because military authorities feared an inva-
sion and felt constrained to take proper security measures. "The need for action
was great, and time was short." The Court refused to say that the "actions were
unjustified" and held them constitutional. Another course was proposed by Mr.
Justice Roberts and, for different reasons, by Mr. Justice Murphy. Both refused to
yield to the doctrine of military necessity and declared the measure "a dear vio-
lation of constitutional rights;' let the chips fall where they would. It seemed to
29. 323 U. S. 214.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
me then, and does now, that the measure was an unconstitutional one which the
Court should not bring within the Constitution by any doctrine of necessity, a
doctrine too useful as a precedent. I thought the courts should not lend them-
selves to its enforcement and we should discharge the prisoner from custody underjudicial commitment. But had the military authorities attempted to enforce the
measure by their own force and authority, the Court should not attempt active
interference, since the West Coast was then a proper theatre for military opera-
tions. I can add nothing to my dissent in the case, though I have to admit that
my view, if followed, would come close to a suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus or recognition of a state of martial law at the time and place found proper
for military control.
Temperate and thoughtful people find difficulties in such conflicts which
only partisans find no trouble in deciding wholly one way or the other. It is easy,
by giving way to the passion, intolerance and suspicions of wartime, to reduce
our liberties to a shadow, often in answer to exaggerated claims of security.
Also, it is easy, by contemptuously ignoring the reasonable anxieties of wartime as
mere "hysteria," to set the stage for by-passing courts which the public thinks have
become too naive, too dilatory and too sympathetic with their enemies and be-
trayers. Lax law enforcement is the enemy of civil rights under law, for it cre-
ates the demand for the military trial and for extralegal vigilante organizations,
such as the ill-famed American Protective League of the First World War. And
if the people come deeply to feel that civil rights are being successfully turned
against their institutions by their enemies, they will react by becoming enemies
of civil rights. Such was the case in the Lincoln era-there is no doubt where
popular feeling stood in the contest between Lincoln and Taney. After all, we
have to acknowledge the historical fact that international hostility has resulted in
surprise attacks and conquests, in unanticipated disasters and overthrows, and in
catastrophic treachery and betrayals.
The Communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia, followed by their destruction
of all civil rights of those who had shown them tolerance, poses the dilemma of
all free people. There the Benes-Masaryk government was completely tolerant
of Communist opposition. They were allowed generous liberties of press and
speech and assembly. They were even taken into high posts in government, be-
cause they claimed to represent a substantial minority of the citizenship. That
liberty was used to overthrow liberty and to set up a murderous regime which
tolerated not the slightest deviation in thought, speech or action from the Com-
munist dogma. Perhaps they could not have succeeded but.for their geographic
location and the proximity of a Red army. But the example of Communist abuse
of Czechoslovakian liberty will long make difficult the path of those who would
give complete liberty of action to internal enemies.
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The American dilemma is perhaps best illustrated by that scene in Masonic
Hall at Baltimore, when Chief Justice Taney heard the return to his writ of
habeas corpus to military authorities who were holding Merryman without charges,
warrant, trial, or conviction. Taney, the constitutionalist, was outraged by this
flagrant invasion of Merryman's constitutional rights. These he would protect,
even if in doing so he gave free rein to those who sought overthrow of the
Union. In the White House was a man who would preserve the Union, even by
disregarding constitutional rights of those fomenting rebellion. It may be that
his extreme measures were not necessary, that the war would have been won
without them. But I suppose a poll to name the greatest benefactor of freedom
this country ever had would result in a heavy majority for Abraham Lincoln.
The issue between authority and liberty is not between a right and a wrong-
that never presents a dilemma. The dilemma is because the conflict is between
two rights, each in its own way important. Taney in the light of his duties
was right, and Lincoln in the light of his duty was right. And if logic supports
Taney, history vindicates Lincoln.
It is customary to tell students how urgently these great issues challenge
them, and how soon they will have to face the greatest challenge of history. I for-
bear such extravagances. The problem of liberty and authority ahead are slight
in comparison with those of the 1770's or the 1860's. We shall blunder and dis-
pute, and decide and overrule decisions. And the common sense of the Ameri-
can people will preserve us from all extremes which would destroy our heritage.
